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In Finland the private sector borrowing started to rise rapidly in conjunction with
the liberalization afcapital movements and deregulation ofthe domestic financial
sector during the second half af the 1980s. The financial deregulation coincided
with and amplified an economic boom marked by favourable income expectations,
laase fiscal policy assaciated with impraved terms af trade and anticipated
reduction in income tax rates. AlI these factors contributed ta the overheating of
the Finnish economy that finally turned into a severe recession in the beginning
of 1990s.
The reaction ofhouseholds to financial deregulation in Finland was similar to
that in the other Nordic countries. As in Norway and Sweden, household indebted-
ness started to rise in the mid-1980s, after the abolishment of lending rate regula-
tions and prior savings requirements for housing loans. Measured by the ratia af
household debt ta annual disposabIe income, household indebtedness peaked in
1990 at more than 80 per cent af annual disposable income. Since then, it has
fallen slightly.
Debt financing in the corporatesectorstarted to increase rapidly in conjunction
with the liberalization af capitaI movements, which enabled firms also in the
domestic sector to raise loans in fareign currencies. During the 1980s debt
financing grew most in the reaI estate business, construction and services. Despite
increased borrowing, the debt with respect to equity af Finnish firms did not rise
significantly until 1990-91, because a large part af the debt grawth was matched
by increases in corparate earnings and equity values during the late 1980s.
Recession turned the situation for the worse as corporate eamings and the market
vaIue af assets plummeted. High indebtedness and overcapacity especially in the
domestic sector will require several years af adjusting.
• We are very grateful to Vesa Vihriälä fOf clarifying and corrective comments and to Glenn
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51 Introduction
As in the other Nordic countries, the private sector borrowing expanded rapidly in
Finland in the secand half af the 1980s. The era of easy credit and economic
growth ended in 1990 in an exceptionally severe recession marked by sharply
falling real estate and stock prices, which has considerably weakened the financial
positian of bOITowers. As inflation has declined while nominal interest rates have
risen, the debt service burden has grown. With a higher real interest rate, business
failures and bankruptcies have increased dramatically. Consequently, banks' credit
lasses have escalated, eroding their capital position and forcing them into greater
dependency on government support ta maintain their capital ratios and lending
capacity. The Govemment has clearIy stated that it wiII guarantee alI deposits
without !imit and ensure the viability of the banking system in alI circumstances.
Private sector overheating was due not only ta loose fiscal policy but also to
deregulation of capital movements and bank lending. Even thaugh deregulation
started in the early 1980s, the most important restrictions were lifted in 1986 and
1987. 1n 1986 the BankafFinland removed interest rate eeilings on bank lending,
and in 1987 corparate long-term borrowing from abroad was completeIy freed.
Besides the liberalization of lending, regulation af deposit rates was eased in late
1980s.
1 AlI the remaining restrictions were lifted by 1991, so there are no longer
any quantitative restrictions ar interest rate limitatians on lending.
Apart from the initial stock-adjustment to the new borrawing possibilities and
to increased income expectations, private sector borrowing was fuelled by asset
price develapments. An upward spiral emerged as borrowingspilled over to higher
domestic demand, profits, earnings and employment, which led to an upward
revision af ineome expectations, skyrocketing stoek prices, greater demand for
housing and soaring housing prices. Increased equity values and asset prices in
turn made it possible for banks to continue expanding credit. This paper reviews
the growth af indebtednessand the adjustments in indebtedness due to money
market deregulation.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a review ofthe recent boom
in bank lending and its role in the onset ofthe debt problem. Next we consider the
debt problem from the bOITawers' paint of view: how households and firms
accumulated excessive debts. Finally we analyze the relationship between
investment and savings and the need to improve the eUITent account. Special
attention is paid to the question to what extent debt financing has been used ta
enlarge praductive capacity ar improve efficiency: ifinvestment in productian and
manufacturing proves to be profitable, indebtedness should be no problern. On the
other hand, if increased funds were channeIled mainly into the real estate, changes
ofresidence ar stack purchases, there is no increase in produetive investment. Debt
1 Limitations on deposit rates have been effected through tax regulations in the form ofceilings on
allowable taxfree nominal retum. This induced the banks to refrain from competitive pricing of
such deposits. The maximum tax exempt return on deposits was tied to the central bank base rate.
Currently, two-year time deposits with a return that is two percentage points less than the base rate
are tax free. Three-year taxfree deposits with retum one percentage point less than the base rate are
available until end-1993. From the beginning of 1991 taxable bank deposits were also allowed,
subject to a 10 per cent withholding tax. From 1992 the source tax rate was raised to 15 per cent,
and for 1993-94 to 20 per cent.
7and interest expenses simply increase without any increase in the ability to
generate income. It would seem risky for a small open economy to invest heavily
only in domestic production. The export/GDP ratia should be taken into
consideration and policy shauld react mare sensitively ta changes in terms aftrade
in setting a proper limit to indebtedness.
82 Trends in banking and bank lending during
the 1980s
Finnish financial markets have been dominated by the banks. For some decades
this was supported by the tax-exempt low-yield deposits. The authorities kept
interest rates low probably to encourage vigoraus grawth in investment. Apart
from deposits, household saving could only go into government bonds and stocks.
On the borrowing side, this meant that accumulated savings and the bank-customer
relationship were the keys ta credit access.
The deregulation of the Finnish financial markets in the middle of 1980s set
off a boom in bank le-nding and a shift from a highly oligopolistic banking
structure to a more competitive environment (Figure 1). One afthe most important
changes was the liberalization af foreign borrowing, which had formerly been
tightly controlled by the Bank af Finland. Without this change, banks' ability ta
pump money into the economy and in particular into the service and home market
sectors would have been considerably less than it was.
2 However, it should be
emphasized that the regulation af capital movements was already laasening up
because af the special payment arrangements with the former Soviet Union, that
made the financing arbitrage passible. Another significant deregulation concerned
bank lending rates. The Bank af Finland started the step-by-step dismantling af
average lending-rate controls in 1983. This created the preconditions far diversified
and more efficient financial markets based on almost free formation of interest
rates. The interbank market actually started to operate after 1986, when the Bank
af Finland introduced a spread between borrowing and deposit rates in the call
money market.
Saan after deregulation banks started to increase their share af new net
financing by the publie. Other financial institutions lost same of their share in
financial intermediation. Increased interest rate and exchange rate risks and the
need ta manage them acted as a spur ta product development in the derivative
markets (Malkamäki and Soittila, 1991). The overall structure afthe capital market
changed dramatically during 1980s. The abolitian af interest rate controls quickly
increased the volume af bank loans linked ta money market rates. Currently, aver
70 per cent afnew hank loans are linked ta money market rates ar bear fixed rates
of interest. A slowly decreasing partion af loans - mainly old housing laans - is
stilI tied ta the base rate.
Apart from the loasening af contrals on interest rates and capital movements,
a couple afother important decisions were made that affected the growth af bank
lending. Deposit banks were allowed ta issue certificates of deposits 3 (Figure 2).
Furthermore, the Banking Supervision Office allowed banks to raise their own
2 The annual growth rate of bank lending in real terms peaked in 1988 when loans outstanding
increased nearly 20 per eent from the previous year. It should be noted, for example, that by the
time deregulation was largely a faet of life, the US financial crisis involving mainly the savings
banks was not visible. Roughly speaking, the same mistakes were made at about the same time in
a11 the Nordie countries.
3 The Bank af Finland started open market operations with certificates of deposits in 1987, and
now most of the trading in the money market is in CDs. Bank Cds soon became the main
instrument in the money market. CDs are crucial in the determination ofshort-terrn money market
rates (Kontulainen, 1991).
9capital by over FIM 4 hilIion through vaIue adjustment.
4 This enabled the banks
ta increase their lending by some FIM 50 billion. Unfortunately, this new bank
capital, largely in the fonn ofstocks and real estate, was not as permanent as was
believed.
The lending boom was further facilitated by buoyant asset markets,
particularly by increasing real estate and housing prices, which reduced the
importance of eredit rationing. Furthermore, optimistic expectations concerning
future economic development and low default rates diminished the importance af
distinguishing between good and bad eredit risks. Lending for real estate and
housing purehases was eonsidered almost riskless, sinee the purchased property
was used as eollatera1.
5
Intense competition for market share led many loeal banks, whieh had
formerly foeused on finaneing households and agrieulture, to expand their activities
into the eorporate sector. Unable to find and finance ne'N customers among the
large and well-known export companies, the savings banks aggressively targeted
small and medium sized firms that focused on the domestic market. This drew the
big commereial banks into the competition for market share in the service,
eonstruction and property sectors. As a resuIt, alI banking groups increased their
lending to home market industries. At the end ofthe 1980s eommercial banks also
ensured their ownership position in important Finnish insuranee and manufaeturing
firms by taking part in the major restructuring.
The banks' exposure to domestic seetor borrowers and increased funding from
abroad made them vulnerable ta movements in stock and real estate prices as well
as the exchange rate. Real estate and housing priees are important because the
property is normally used as collateral for lending.
6 Stoek prices are also
important for the banks' eapital position because one of the principal eomponents
of bank capital is based on equity holdings. In Finland banks have significant
holdings in large eorporations, whieh sensitizes their own eapital to variations in
stoek priees. The exehange rate has also become increasingly important because
the share of foreign curreney-denominated lending in banks' loan portfolios has
increased dramatically since the mid-1980s. This does not, however, imply direct
exchange-rate risk, since banks are nat allowed to have significant open positions.
Indirectly, through domestic sector borrowers' ability to serviee debt, foreign
currency lending is a significant risk factar. Looking back, it may alsa be said that
banks could not expect a devaluatian of the markka by over 30 per cent, whieh
underlines the faet that currency loans were intermediated tao easily ta borrowers
with no foreign eurrency ineome.
During the last two or three years the capital positian af Finnish banks has
undergone a majar ehange, and substantial eredit losses have inereased the
4 The Banking Supervision Office in Finland is a separate body from the Bank af Finland, under
the Ministry of Finance. The role af the office is currently under reorganization.
5 Consumption function studies have shown that liquidity constraints on households were shifted
away almost completely with respect to the broad consumer wealth concept (earnings plus wealth
in market vaIue less debt). The marginal propensity to consume from real wealth increased
significantly during 1987-89.
6 E.g. nominal housing prices have fallen about 50 per cent since the peak in spring 1989 to the
end of 1992. In case af defaults the reduced value af collateral will cause a substantial worsening
in the banks' capital pasition.
10financial vulnerability af the entire banking sector. 1n 1992 alane credit lasses
amounted to some 4 percent ofloans outstanding. This change is Iargely due to the
collapse in Soviet trade, deteriorating terms af trade and sharply falling stock, real
estate and housing prices. The central bank, of course, tried to guide and
consolidate bank lending, e.g. by squeezing liquidity, by means of cash reserve
requirements, base rate hikes, special investment deposit requirements and, finally,
the revaluatian af the markka in 1989. But the effect was only limited (Figures 3
and 4). The most aggressive lenders during the period af averheating were the
savings and commercial banks. Therefore, it is no wonder that the amount ofnOll-
performing loans and credit losses incurred by these banking groups have been
greater than those of the cooperative banks (Figures 5 and 6).\ Among the IocaI
savings banks, there was a group of open-handed lenders nicknamed the "dirty
dozen".
Another important factor increasing the losses suffered by banks in the current
recession has been the substantial rise in real interest rates. Average nominal rates
on new loans rose from about 11 per cent in late 1988 ta 15 per cent in autumn
1992, while infiation declined from five to three per cent. The problem with high
laan rates is that they may lead to increasing credit losses thraugh bankruptcies
etc. and to lower profitability for banks. According to recent theoretical and
empirical literature, there is a limit to the level to which a profit maximizing bank
can raise interest rates without reducing its revenue. The reason for this is that as
the interest rate is increased, the default rate increases. At some point the default
rate is so high that any further increase in the interest rate actually reduces
revenue. Furthermare, higher interest rates discourage borrowers with law risk low
return projects (adverse selection), and encourages borrowers to take risks once
they obtain loans (moral hazard). Consequently, the average credit quality of a
bank's customers worsens and default rates rise as the interest rate rises.
Besides the problems associated with increased lending, deteriorating quality
af customers and high default rates, Finnish banks felI into the interest rate trap,
as one half af the volume af outstanding loans and only ane third of deposit
volume is based on the base rate, which is regulated by the central bank. Two-
thirds af deposits is based on short-term money market rates. Even though the
average interest rates on new loans increased rapidly after mid-1988 up to autumn
1992, the interest rate margin charged by banks has been relatively constant. Credit
losses have forced banks to keep their interest margins wide
7 (Figures 7 and 8).
Financial distress and increasing credit losses have argued for stricter capital
adequacy standards, more cautious borrower evaluation and measures to effectively
contral the growth in bank lending. In particular, collateral requirements have been
tightened by the banks. More recently, a shortage of hank capital has become a
threat ta the credit supply. 1n respanse, the central govemment has been forced to
provide substantial aid to banks so as ta maintain their capital ratios. Support by
the authorities was first used to rescue a major commercial bank in September
1991. In June 1992, central government support was provided to 41 savings banks
under distress. In November 1992 a relatively small commercial bank (STS) was
merged into one af the biggest commercial banks (KOP). The merger was
7 For some borrowers it may have come as a surprise that inflation has not deflated their loans
even after devaluations. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that through free capitaI
movements we have shifted permanently to positive real deposit rates.
11facilitated by the transfer of bad loans to the Government Guarantee Fund. A bill
was drafted for the establishment af a bad bank, but it failed at the last moment
in Parliament and the Government drafted a supplementary budget ta handle bad
10ans. The only banking group that has not yet applied for capital support from the
Government Guaran~ee Fund is the cooperative hank group. Total central
government support reached some 4 per cent af GDP in 1992. Finnish banks'
operating profit in 1992was a negative FIM 21.5 billion, which accounts precisely
for the volume of credit and collateral losses. The banking crisis is expected ta
continue in 1993.
The prolonged recession has rapidly reduced the demand far credit, reflecting
the decline in demand for new construction, investment gaods and consumer
durable. However, lending during 1992 has been unusually weak because af the
unusually high indebtedness af both the household and corporate sectors. Due ta
increasing unemployment and declining income Ievels, households' debt burden
is stilI worsening, although on average household indebtedness has started to
deerease slowly. The deterioration of corporate balance sheets and reduced
collateral values has made it very difficult to apply for new 10ans. Hence, it may
be that in the current recession the normal decline in credit demand has been
exacerbated by a greater-than-normal erosion in the creditworthiness of potential
borrowers.
12Figure 1.
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153 Household indebtedness
The reactian afhouseholds to financial deregulation in Finland was similar to that
in the ather Nordic countries (Figure 9). As in Norway and Sweden, hausehold
borrowing started ta rise and the saving ratio to falI in the mid-1980s, after the
dismantlement of lending rate regulations. ln October 1987 the Bank of Finland
quit issuing guidelines to the banks on priar savings required for housing and other
persanal loans. Further deregulation suceeeded when housing laans were allowed
ta be linked ta three- and five-year money market rates in the beginning of 1988.
A sharp peak in housing loan drawings is visible for 1988 (Figures 10 and 11).
8
Looking back, it seems that the abolishment af prior saving requirements for
housing laans has been one ofthe major problems in the deregulation proeess with
respect to households. Of course, it could be said that banks and perhaps also
households' should have foreseen the consequences and risks in this decision.
Although rising housing prices set offa rapid increase in housing investment,
the major part of housing market activity took place in eonneetion with ehanges
in residence involving largerhousing laans (Figures 12 and 13). It can be said that
almost nothing was achieved exeept greater household indebtedness and higher
debt service costs (Figures 14 and 15).
Mast measures af indebtedness af households reveal a elear and steep rising
phase after 1987 up to spring 1989. After 1989 some measures indicate a further
worsening. The ratio of househald debt to GDP has continued to rise up ta the
present time, because of declining GDP. At the end af 1991 the ratia was 45 per
cent (inel. entrepreneurial debt), which is still rather low by international standards
(Figure 16).
Measured by the ratia ofhousehold debt to net disposable income, hausehold
indebtedness peaked in 1990 at more than 80 per centafannual disposable income
(Figure 17). Since then, it has fallen slightly. However, in 1992 this measure rose
temporarily, as the decline in real income was steeper than the decline in
outstanding loans.
Because the ability of households to overcome their debt problem is also
related ta household wealth, developments in housing and asset priees are crucia1.
The value of collateral and the willingness of banks to renegotiate debt contracts
depend on them. Household indebtedness has clearly increased in relation ta
financial wealth, since the fall in asset prices (Figure 18). The ratio af hausehold
tatal debt ta household financial wealth (excluding stocks) was 90 per cent in the
second quarter of 1992. The defiation of hausehald wealth can also be seen from
wealth/income ratios (Figures 19 and 20).
In spite afthe rapid increase in household's overall debt (ine!. entrepreneurial
loans) between 1987 and 1989, the composition of the debt did not change much
(Figures 21 and 22). Housing laans and consumer loans both peaked in early 1988.
Compared ta e.g. Sweden, the Finnish housing market has concentrated more on
owner-occupied housing. In 1988 about 72 per cent af Finnish households were
living in their own dwellings. Although most of the housing loans were granted
8 Currency regulations were eliminated only gradually. Households were allowed to make direct
foreign investments in 1990 and to raise foreign currency-denominated loans in October 1991, just
before the devaluation af the markka.
16for changes afdwelling, a rather substantial number afnew borrowers emerged on
the market. With a relatively fixed housing supply and regulated rental markets,
the increased demand and bank lending led to a bubble in housing prices.
Depressed domestic demand and increasing unemployment will cantinue ta
dampen hauseholds' borrawing in the future. Hauseholds are trying ta adapt to a
lower Ievel afindebtedness because oflower eamings expectatians. From the point
af view af households, the most significant factar affecting the willingness ta
borrow is the threat afunemployment. So far, unemployment has shifted from the
industrial sector ta services, and because of the depreciation af the markka since
September 1992, this shift has accelerated.
So far, households' share of bad debt has been around 21 per cent af noo-
performing laans and 6-7 per cent afcredit losses, but these ratias are expected ta
increase. As an example af mistaken evaluation on the part afbanks, a significant
part afnew hausing laans in 1988-90 were supplied without any prior savings af
priar client relatianship and withaut sufficient callateral. At the mament, the
collapse af housing prices is increasing the ratia af hausing laans ta housing
wealth, thereby lowering the vaIue af collateral (Figure 23). The compasition of
household gross wealth is shown in Figures 24 and 25.
17Figure 9.
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18Figure 12.
REAL BANK LENDING AND REAL HOUSING PRICES, 1971/01-1992/02
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I RATIO OF HOUSEHOLD GROSS AND NET WEALTH TO DISPOSABLE INCOME, 1979/01 - 91/Q4
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234 Corporate indebtedness
The financial situationafthe Finnish corporate sector is characterized by the same
kind of debt overhang and debt burden as the household sector. Historically, the
capital intensive export firms have had relatively high-indebtedness, partly because
af the favoured tax status of debt financing. 1n times of ecanamic downturn and
financial distress the traditionai remedy has been the devaluatian afthe markka so
as to boost exports and corporate earnings.
Despite the considerable depreciation af the markka since November 1991 the
overall financial situation af the corporate sector has not improved markedly. On
the contrary, financial difficulties have become worse in many respects although
the leverage af export firms has started ta level off. The origin for this unusually
difficult situation is found in the investment boom that took place in the. second
halfafthe 1980s. The majarity afthis investment activity occurred in the domestic
sector, which has been hit hard by the recession, e.g., residential and nonresidential
construction, real estate and services. As domestic demand has fallen off since
1990, a large partafthese investments tumed out to he excessive and unprafitable.
Trends in the carporate sector's total debt and currency-denominated debt are
shown in Figure 26 as ratias afthe outstanding debt to GDP. During 1985-92 the
ratio of totaI corporate debt to GDP increased from 70 per cent to nearly 90 per
cent. Corporate debt relative to GDP also increased considerably during the 1980s
in Japan, the UK, Australia and Sweden (OECD 1992). Recessions in these
countries have also pushed debt repayment burdens above historic levels by the
1990s.
Despite increased Ieverage, the indebtedness of Finnish firms did not become
a major problem until 1990-91, because a large part of the debt grawth was
matched by increases in corporate earnings and asset values during the late 1980s.
Since 1991 the deterioration af carporations financial condition has been rapid,
because afhigher interest rates and the sharp decline in eamings and asset values.
For the first time since the second warld war, high leverage during a deep
recession has become a major concern also for firms in the domestic markets. 1n
conjunction with the deregulation af bank lending and foreign borrowing, firms in
the service and home market sectors substantially increased their debt financing,
halfafwhich was denominated in foreign currencies (Figures 27 and 28). Foreign
currency loans gained popularity especially in real estate, constructian and trade
because of a relatively large differential between domestic and foreign interest
rates. During the late 1980s more than halfafalI corporate sector foreign currency
loans went into the domestic sector (Figure 29). As a consequence afhigh foreign
debts, the depreciation of the markka since 1991 has considerably worsened the
leverage afhome market firms by increasing the markka value afforeign currency
10ans.
As in the household sectar, the problems af debt overhang in the carparate
sector have been exacerbated by the heavy burden afdebt servicing resulting from
high real interest rates combined with low or even negative growth in corporate
eamings. Real interest rates have been histarically high over the past two years.
The increasing impact of high interest rates on cash flow is shown in Figure 30.
The ratia of interest payments to cash flow before interest, depreciatian and
dividends was some 70 per cent at the end of 1991 compared ta less than 45 per
cent in 1981. However, the present reduction af interest rates will ease the debt
24service burden to some degree. Furthermore, firms have also started a considerable
cost adjustment by shedding labouf, cutting back spending on investment and
reducing inventory holdings. Improved cash flows have been redirected towards
the repayment af outstanding debt.
It is clear that during the recession the quality af borrowers has eroded, and in
spite of decreased borrowing, the indebtedness af firms is stilI rising in some
domestic sectors. It has been estimated that the debt overhang and serious
overcapacity in many domestic sectors will take several years to be fully adjusted
(Brunila 1992). Because af the deteriorated balance sheets and reduced values af
collateral, it has become increasingly difficult for small and medium sized firms
in particular ta gain access ta outside financing. The inability to get new loans to
ease the acute liquidity problems has triggered bankruptcy amongst otherwise
viable firms. Bankruptcies reached alI time highs in 1991-92 (Figure 31).
25Figure 26.
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275 Saving and investment balance
The indebtedness problem can also be analyzed from the standpaint of investment
and expected returns. From the point of view of balanced economic growth, the
opportunity ta use extra capital sources from abroad distorted the Finnish econamy
by breaking the close relationship between national savings and investment in the
late 1980s. Increasing amount af private investments were financed by foreign
debL The share of net foreign debt ta GDP rose about 20 per cent in 1988 to 48
per cent in 1992.
In the three-year period 1987-89 private sector debt increased by FIM 178.7
billion, which accounted for about 36 per cent af GDP in 1989. The difference
between bank markka lending and deposits was over FIM 25 billion. This figure,
however, understates the true gap between deposits and loans because banlcs
intermediated foreign currency-denominated loans worth ofFIM 100 billion during
the period.
In the overheated ecanomy, ineame expeetations were exceptionally optimistie
from 1987 to mid-1989, whieh kept the investment boom going up to 1991.
However, households started ta cut housing purchases and once again build up
precautionary savings already in spring 1989 (Figures 32 and 33). Since then, the
household saving rate has continued to rise as households have foeused on paying
back their debts, despite falling eamings (Figure 34). Moreover, steadily rising real
interest rates have undaubtedly dampened demand for new credits and made
plaeements in interest-bearing assets attraetive. Aceording to the latest consumer
eonfidence inquiries, the times are stilI favourable for savings, but not for
purchases af durable and housing.
The investment boom was not due solely to inereased housing purehases and
housing investment (Figures 35 and 36). In faet, private eorporate investment grew
faster than housing investment. Public investment was relatively stable during the
entire 1980s. Within the private sector, investments grew particularly in the service
sector, retail trade, hotel and restaurant and recreational serviees, as well as in
construction and real estate (Figure 37).
Increased investment aetivity in the private sector could be seen as being
largely responsible for the deteriorating eurrent aceount deficit, because the bulk
ofthese investments were financed by currency loans (Figure 38). Even though the
trade balance has turned pasitive since the devaluation af the markka in 1991 and
1992, debt service costs and extensive government lending have kept the current
aceount negative. Due to increased govemment borrowing, natianal indebtedness
is stilI rising.
So far the emphasis has been in the role af optimistie expeetations in the mid
1980s. Another important faetor was the favourable development in the terms of
trade during 1986-89 (Figures 39 and 40). Largely due to declining oil prices in
the mid-1980s the terms af trade improved and amplified the domestic boom.
Since autumn 1990 the terms of trade has developed unfavourably, which has
steepened the recession.
28Figure 32.
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The current ecanomic crisis in Finland is the warst in the century, apart from the
two world wars. Because af the collapse af Soviet trade, deteriorating terms af
trade and deep recession, the banking system has been experiencing heavy debt
losses. Much af the blarne for the recession has been levelled at the banks; and it
is easy to corne to the conclusion that the recession would have been much more
bearable if the financial system had not lost its sense of proportion in the late
1980s.
Banks' skills in evaluating and monitaring credit and risks have become more
important now in a deregulated enviranment. In retrospect, it seems clear that
financial liberalization has not yet produced a smoother-functioning financial
system, in which the price of credit alone can do the job of allocating debt
financing.
Financial liberalization opened up the markets ta private borrowers, who have
actively utilized their new opportunity. The most important task for banks is ta
intermediate financing in liquid deposits to real (illiquid) investment. If foreign
loans are used in these investments, there is no guarantee that the rise in domestic
interest rates will restrain the investment. It seems more appropriate to look at the
current account to see whether the increase in debt is bearable. From 1985 ta the
end af 1991, the indebtedness of the corporate sector increased from 65 to 86 per
cent af GDP. In the household sectar, the increase was from 30 ta almost 45 per
cent of GDP. The export/GDP and industrial production/GDP ratios were not
viewed seriously, although they are important in a small open economy.
It is clear that private debt grew tao fast during the late 1980s. Banks
intermediated financing without considering the risk ofexcessive indebtedness of
their customers. Another strategic mistake made by banks was in cancentrating on
real estate business and the damestic service sector at the expence ofexport sector.
Moreover, it seems clear that the role of interest rates in clearing the market was
misinterpreted, as banks did not react ta rising risk premia to any significant
extent. The debt burden is even more problematic as the bulk af foreign lending
was used ta finance the domestic private sector, which was not capable af
generating export revenue. This makes the domestic recessian steeper and the
recovery slower.
Hawever, it is clearly understood that maintaining the stability af the
financing system is crucia1. The BIS standards for capital adequacy have forced
the govemment to back up the banks by covering part af their losses through
capital investment. The central bank has tried to ease the credit crunch by reducing
reserve requirements (from spring 1990 to autumn 1992) so as ta preserve
liquidity, and the Government Guarantee Fund has kept the banks' capital at an
adequate level.
32Table 1. TotaI NationaI Debt by Sector, FIM billion
Corporate
House- Corpo- TotaI Foreign direct
National TotaI hoId rate foreign long-term currency
Year debi lending debt debt debt debt loans GDP
1980 190.8 154.4 36.6 127.2 66 18.3 192.6
1981 216.7 178.2 43.6 145.6 78 20.7 218.5
1982 255.4 208.1 52.0 170.1 103 52.9 25.4 245.7
1983 299.2 236.6 60.6 190.0 120 58.3 27.3 274.6
1984 345.2 267.4 68.5 211.7 146 68.0 29.3 308.4
1985 386.2 311.0 79.8 216.9 141 68.4 27.1 335.0
1986 441.5 347.0 91.0 237.4 145 71.7 24.7 357.6
1987 499.3 395.2 107.6 260.8 173 78.6 23.6 391.6
1988 593.4 474.6 138.7 302.5 203 95.8 28.1 441.5
1989 685.4 542.3 160.2 346.9 228 115.8 35.5 496.9
1990 751.4 604.7 166.6 404.0 279 149.1 50.8 525.9
1991 795.9 636.0 171.4 433.7 352 217.3 66.3 503.6
1992* 170.0 427.1 85.1 490.8
Source: Statistics Finland, Financing statistics
Table 2. Household Debt, FIM million
Entrepreneurial debt is included in corporate debt
Household Household Financial AlI Household
housing Consumer Household financial wealth- housing debt/GDP
Year loans credits debt wealth stock loans ratia
1980 28146.6 8462.6 36609.2 77305.1 73180 45301.0 19.0
1981 33795.3 9834.5 43629.8 90550.5 85596 52130.1 20.0
1982 40202.9 11751.2 51954.1 102521.1 95216 59996.6 21.1
1983 47453.7 13102.9 60556.6 120779.5 108800 68222.4 22.1
1984 54266.3 14275.6 68541.9 139365.0 125720 74360.0 22.2
1985 61406.2 18435.3 79841.5 165468.3 149603 85968.8 23.8
1986 68769.6 22211.0 90980.6 185489.1 166772 94418.0 25.4
1987 79915.7 27664.0 107579.7 216713.3 190689 108411.9 27.5
1988 100940.6 37800.5 138741.1 273692.4 231664 135043.0 31.4
1989 117617.5 42595.9 160213.4 282701.0 241484 155808.6 32.2
1990 122572.0 44071.5 166643.5 275477.1 248153 167079.8 31.7
1991 125636.5 45746.7 171383.2 267179.1 247709 174311.8 34.1
1992* 125270.3 44716.3 169986.6 265149.3 249959 177766.3 34.6
33Table 3. Corporate debt, FIM billion
Corporate debt
(1) (2) (3) 1+2+3 Whereof
Pure euro Ioans Direct = total Corporate
markka- mediat. by currency total markka debt/GDP
Year loans banks loans debt debt GDP ratia
1980 94.8 14.1 18.3 127.2 108.9 192.6 66.0
1981 109.4 15.5 20.7 145.6 124.9 218.5 66.7
1982 123.9 20.8 25.4 170.1 144.8 245.7 69.2
1983 138.1 24.6 27.3 190.0 162.7 274.6 69.2
1984 153.7 28.7 29.3 211.7 182.4 308.4 68.7
1985 159.8 30.0 27.1 216.9 189.8 335.0 64.8
1986 182.0 30.7 24.7 237.4 212.7 357.6 66.4
1987 193.9 43.3 23.6 260.8 237.2 391.6 66.6
1988 221.6 52.8 28.1 302.5 274.4 441.5 68.5
1989 244.9 66.5 35.5 346.9 311.4 496.9 69.8
1990 248.5 104.7 50.8 404.0 353.2 525.9 76.8
1991 257.2 110.2 66.3 433.7 367.4 503.6 86.2
1992* 250.0 92.0 85.1 427.1 342.0 490.8 87.0
Source: Statistics Finland, Financing statistics
*) Preliminary value or value in 1992/03
34Appendix
Timetable of financial deregulation affecting banking and
the handling af Finnish banking problems
June 1982 Authorized banks were allowed to take part in lending
consortia with foreign banks. The share af the finaneing was
limited to 50 per cent for domestic firms and 20 per cent for
foreign firms.
September 1985 The Bank of Finland issued new guidelines on the granting af
personai loans. Housing loans remained unaffected: first-tirne
buyers were required to provide 25 per cent priar savings,
hameowners least one-third.
January 1986 The Bank af Finland revised its regulations on the banks'
average lending rate with effect from the beginning af 1986.
The bank lending rate was permitted ta exceed the Bank af
Finland's base rate by maximum af 1.75 percentage points.
Upper limit on banks' lending rates were abolished. However,
if the average interest rate on a bank's total markka-denomi-
nated deposits exceeded the central banks base rate by more
than 1.25 percentage points, the bank's average lending rate
could at most equal the average deposit rate for the manth in
question plus 0.5 percentage point.
The dual interest rate system was introduced in the call money
market. A lower rate was paid on depasits than was charged
on call money credits.
May 1986 The base rate was lowered from 8 to 7 per cent. Regulation of
bank lending rates was relaxed by raising the upper limit on
average interest rate by 0.25 pereentage point, Le. from 9.75
ta 9 per cent.
Upper limits were placed on the amount of foreign credit
intermediated by banks for financing imports.
August 1986 The Bank ofFinland totally abolished the regulation af banks'
average lending rates.
November 1986 Lending rates applied to shart and medium-term loan
agreements could be linked ta a reference rate reflecting the
east of unregulated short-term funding. Banks were stilI
required to link lending rates on housing loans and ather long-
term loans (over five years) to the base rate or to charge fixed











The Bank of Finland complemented its system of monetary
control by intraducing trade with banks in certificates af
deposit on an experimental basis, along with term credits and
term assets.
The Bank af Finland eased restrictians on the use of money
market rates as reference rates. The Bank began to publish
daily 1, 2, 3, 6, 9 and 12-month HELIBOR money market
rates.
The savings and cooperative banks were aIlowed ta deal in
eertifieates of deposit with the Bank af Finland, provided the
banks met the requirements for trading.
The Bank of Finland ceased issuing precise guidelines to the
banks concerning prior savings required for housing loans and
other personai loans.
The Bank of Finland commeneed to ealculate and publish 3-
and 5-year long-term market rates on a monthly basis. Bank
were allowed ta use these rates as reference rates in their
lending (inel. housing loans). The long-term reference rates are
based on market rates for taxable, fixed-rate bonds. Banks
could ilse these 10ng-term market rates as reference rates for
their new long-term housing loans.
The Bank of Finland clarified the regulations concerning the
use of 10ng-term fareign loans by prohibiting the inter-
mediation and re-Iending af these loans ta economic agents
wha are not authorized to raise funds abroad.
The Bank ofFinland abalished the financing arrangements for
domestic suppliers' credits, new-export credits and short-term
export credits.
An agreement supplementing the cash reserve agreement
between the Bank of Finland and the banks was signed on
March 13. It enabled the Bank of Finland ta raise the cash
reserve requirement to a maximum af 12 per cent. The
applicatian af this additional requirement was linked ta
developments in bank lending.
The Bank of Finland raised the base amount - the share of
banks' till-money-credit holdings which is not financed by the
Bank af Finland - by over FIM 60 billion as from beginning
af April 1989. The new base amount is effective until the end
of March 1990.
The Bank af Finland allowed banks ta ilse their own prime
interest rates in borrowing and lending. The central bankallowed banks to emit their own certificates of deposit, which
were tradeable with thase emitted by the Bank of Finland.
CDs issued by banks were subjected to certain requirements




A credit tax of 0.5 % was placed on currency loans.
Foreign investments were allowed for households. Lecal
Communities were allowed to raise long-term currency loans
for the financing af expenses.
The Bank of Finland abolished the remaining regulation on
currency loans, except for loans to households.
Repurchase agreements were taken into operation between the
central bank and deposit banks. Banks could not use their own
certificates af deposit or bonds in these agreements.
September 1991 Bank of Finland decided ta take control of Skopbank so as ta
restore confidence in the bank's activities. The central bank
stated that it would assume responsibility for alI Skopbank's
domestic and foreign liabilities and would guarantee
Skopbank's solvency and liquidity under alI circumstances.
October 1991 Private households were allowed to raise currency-denomi-
nated loans.
April 1992 As part of the financial support package for the banking
sector, the Parliamentary Supervisory Baard raises the interest
payable on the banks' cash reserve deposits at the Bank af
Finland by one percentage paint with effect from 1 April. The
new rate was the 3-manth Helibor less two percentage points,
but not less than 8 per cent.
The law establishing the Government Guarantee Fund was
approved by Parliament on 30 April. The purpose af the Fund
is to help ensure the stability af deposit banking and secure
depositors' claims. The fund is autharized to ilse up to FIM 20
billion for these purposes. Decisions on possible support
measures by the fund are taken by the representatives af the
Ministry af Finance, the Banking Supervision Office and the
Bank af Finland on the board af the fund.
May 1992 As part af the financial support package, the Parliamentary
Supervisory Board raises the Bank of Finland's base rate by
one percentage point to 9.5 per cent with effect from 1 May.
As a result af this decision, the banks are allowed to raise the
rate af interest on loans that are tied to the base rate by one
percentage point, but the Bank of Finland recommends that
37June 1992
the rise should not be applied ta rates that are already 12 per
cent or more. Owing ta an amendment ta the law on the tax
relief af deposits and bonds, the base-rate rise does not apply
to interest rates on tax-exempt deposits.
Based on a decisian by the Govemment in March ta make
available FIM 8 billion for investment in banks' care capital,
the Government rnakes a formal offer of investment ta the
banks on 17 June. Capital will be offered to Finnish deposit
banks accarding to their size, as measured by risk-weighted
assets and off-balance-sheet commitments calculated to BIS
standards. The capital was available at two dates, August and
December 1992.
Govemment Guarantee Fund decided to grant capital support
amounting to FIM 5.5 billion and guarantee af FIM 1.7 billion
to the Savings Bank of Finland. The latter was established in
autumn 1992 by merging 41 savings banks.
September 1992 On 8 September, the Bank af Finland decides to temporarily
float the markka because af continuing pressure against the
currency in the foreign exchange rate market.
December 1992 The Govemment Guarantee Fund decided to grant capital
support totalling FIM 1.5 billian ta Skopbank and FIM 4.7
billion to the Savings Bank af Finland.
The handling of Finnish banking problems after December 1992, see Nyberg and
Vihriälä (1993).
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